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Abstract
Due to the fact that the double margin exists in the 
decentralized supply chain, many papers focus on the 
coordination of decentralized supply chain. In this paper, 
we classify these papers into three parts according to the 
structure of supply chain. The first kind of supply chain 
consists of one upstream supplier and one downstream 
retailer. The second one consists of multiple suppliers 
and a single retailer. The last one refers to the supply 
chain with multiple suppliers and a single retailer. This 
paper can enable readers to get the knowledge of existing 
research on supply chain coordination. We also give some 
interesting future research concerning this topic. 
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INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of intra-production 
specialization, the planning process of a final product 
is seldom completed by one firm. This results that the 
production of a final product needs the cooperation 
of some companies. A supply chain can be viewed as 
the cooperation between/ among vertical related firms. 
However, in a decentralized supply chain, each player 
has its own objective rather than that of the entire supply 
chain. For example, with a wholesale price contract, 
an upstream supplier always chooses a wholesale price 
which is higher than production cost to be charged to the 
downstream retailer. As a result, the order quantity of the 
downstream retailer, and hence, the total expected profit of 
upstream supplier and the downstream retailer is less than 
that of central supply chain. Spengler (1950) first observes 
this phenomenon and calls it “double margin”, but he does 
not concern how to eliminate the “double margin”. After 
35 years, Pasternack (1985) notices the importance of 
eliminating the double margin (improves the production 
quantity and increase the total expected profit of supply 
chain), and proposes the concept of “coordination of 
supply chain”. 
Supply chain coordination is not very complex, but 
it is important to study two questions. First, a contract/
mechanism is said to coordinate the supply chain if the set 
of supply chain optimal decisions is a Nash equilibrium, 
i.e., no firm can benefit from a deviation from the set of 
supply chain optimal decisions. In a decentralized push 
supply chain, the action to coordinate is the downstream 
retalier’s order quantity; and in a decentralized pull supply 
chain, the action to coordinate is the upstream supplier’s 
production quantity (the terms “push” and “pull” are both 
adopted from Cachon 2004). When the order/production 
quantity is coordinated, the total expected profit of 
upstream and downstream players in a decentralized 
setting is equal to that of centralized setting. Second, 
which coordination contract/mechanism is acceptable to 
supply chain players? If a non-coordination contract is 
dominated by a coordinating contract, i.e., each firm’s 
expected profit is no worse off and at least one firm is 
strictly better off with the coordinating contract. When the 
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coordination contract has sufficient flexibility to allocate 
the coordinated supply chain’s expected profit among 
supply chain players arbitrarily, there exists contract 
parameters to enable coordination contract dominates a 
non-coordination contract (Cachon, 2003).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 
2, we review the literature on the coordination of supply 
chain (hereafter referred as one-supplier-one-retailer 
supply chain) consisting of one upstream supplier and one 
downstream retailer. Subsequently, Section 3 reviews the 
literature on the coordination of supply chain (hereafter 
referred as one-supplier-multiple-retailers supply chain) 
where one upstream supplier sells its product to multiple 
downstream retailers. The coordination of supply chain 
(hereafter referred as multiple-suppliers-one-retailer 
supply chain) where multiple upstream firms sell their 
products to a downstream retailer is reviewed in Section 
4. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the directions of future 
research. 
1.  COORDINATION OF ONE-SUPPLIER-
ONE-RETAILER SUPPLY CHAIN
One-supplier-one-retailer supply chain is the basic setting. 
There are many contracts can be used to coordinate this 
kind of model.
1.1  Buy Back Contract 
With a buy back contract, the upstream supplier charges 
the downstream retailer a wholesale price w per unit 
purchased, but also pays the downstream retailer b per 
unit remaining at the end of the selling season.
Padmanabhan and Png (1995) discusses returns 
policies which are commonplace in industries, such as 
computing and publishing as well as apparel, cosmetics 
and electrical appliances. Suo and Jin (2004) study the 
coordination of supply chain assuming that the marginal 
cost of the retailer is private information, they show 
that buy back contract can achieve the supply chain 
coordination. Ye and Li (2006) use buy back contract to 
coordinate the supply chain with a risk-averse retailer. Su 
and Zhang (2008) study the impact of strategic customer 
behavior on supply chain’s expected profit and show 
that the buyback contract can be used as an incentive-
coordinating device as well as a commitment device. 
Zhang et al. (2005) study a supply chain with a risk-
neutral supplier and a loss-averse retailer. They show that 
the production quantity of decentralized supply chain is 
less than that of centralized supply chain, and find that the 
supply chain can be achieved by buy back contract. 
1.2  Revenue-Sharing Contract
With a revenue sharing contract, the upstream supplier 
charges the downstream retailer a wholesale price w 
per unit purchased; the downstream retailer gives the 
upstream supplier a percentage of its sale revenue r.
Cachon and Lariviere (2005) study the coordination 
in decentralized supply chain with revenue-sharing 
contract, and show that the supplier can allocate the 
expected profit of supply chain between the supplier and 
the retailer arbitrarily, and thus the Pareto-improvement is 
achieved. Wang et al. (2008) coordinate the supply chain 
with fuzzy demand, by using revenue-sharing contract. 
Linh and Hong (2008) study the channel coordination in 
a two-period newsboy problem through revenue sharing 
contract. Li and Hua (2008) investigate the coordination 
of supply chain with price-sensitive demand, by using 
revenue sharing contract. Yao et al. (2012) coordinate the 
supply chain with a risk-averse retailer through revenue 
sharing contract. 
1.3  Quantity Flexibility Contract
With a quantity flexibility contract, the upstream supplier 
charges the downstream retailer different wholesale prices 
for different order quantities.
Kohli and Park (1994) coordinate the supply chain 
in which the supplier is the leader and the retailer is 
the follower, by quantity flexibility contract. Weng 
(1995a,1995b) coordinates the supply chain with price-
sensitive demand, by quantity flexibility contract. Tsay 
(1999), and Tsay and Lovejoy (1999) illustrate that the 
quantity flexibility contract can enable the retailer’s order 
quantity to be equal to that of centralized supply chain, 
and arbitrarily allocate the supply chain’s expected profit 
between two players. Cachon and Lariviere (2001) study 
the supply chain coordination with demand forecasts, and 
show that the quantity flexibility contract conditionally 
coordinates the supply chain. Xu et al. (2003) deal with 
the problem of supply chain with nonlinear demand 
functions (demand variation makes the real production 
different from originally production). They show that 
such a supply chain can be coordinated by quantity 
flexibility contract. Qi et al. (2004) show that the quantity 
flexibility contract can coordinate the supply chain 
with demand disruption. Wu (2005) studies the supply 
chain coordination with bayesian updating, by using a 
quantity flexibility contract. Corbett and Groote (2000) 
and Burnetas et al. (2007) investigate the coordination 
of supply chain with asymmetric information and find 
that the coordination of supply chain can be achieved 
by quantity flexibility contract. Zhou and Yang (2006) 
investigate the coordination of supply chain with 
asymmetric information and price-sensitive demand. 
Wang and Wang (2008) investigate the coordination of 
supply chain with quantity flexibility contract, assuming 
that the production rate for manufacturer is finite and the 
unit inventory holding cost for the retailer is asymmetric.
1.4  Sales Rebate Contract 
With a sales rebate contract, the upstream supplier first 
charges the downstream retailer a wholesale price w per 
unit purchased, and then gives the retailer an r rebate per 
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unit sold above a threshold m.
Taylor (2002) and Xu et al. (2008) study the supply 
chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort 
effects and gives the condition of coordination. Krishnan 
et al. (2004) investigates the coordination of supply chain 
with retailer promotional effort. They show a mechanism 
combining a buy-back and promotional cost-sharing 
agreement can be used to coordinated the supply chain 
conditionally. 
1.5  Other Contracts 
Beside the above contracts, many other contracts are 
studied to coordinate the supply chain, such as option 
contract, trade credit contract, risk-sharing contract.
Barnes-schuster et al. (2004) show how option 
contract coordinates the supply chain. They find that 
the supply chain can be coordinated if and only if the 
exercise price is piecewise linear. Burnetas and Ritchen 
(2005) study the coordination of supply chain when the 
demand is downward, sloping, by option contract. Ren 
and Chen (2009) investigate supplier’s delay in payments 
and supply chain coordination under retailer’s sales 
effort, by using trade credit contract. They construct 
the one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain model, and 
analyze the coordination condition. Wu and Xu (2009) 
investigate the coordination in decentralized supply 
chain with asymmetric information, they show that linear 
transfer payment schema can be used by the retailer 
to achieve the supply chain coordination. Gan et al. 
(2005) investigate how a supply chain involving a risk-
neutral supplier and a downside-risk-averse retailer can 
be coordinated. They find that the standard buy-back 
or revenue-sharing contracts can not coordinate such a 
system and design a risk-sharing contract to coordinate 
the model. Chen et al. (2006) propose a risk sharing 
contract to coordinate the supply chain. The risk sharing 
contract says that the retailer partially compensates for the 
supplier’s loss that is attributable to the overproduction 
in the first stage, and the supplier provides a partial credit 
for the retailer’s loss that results from overstocking in 
the second stage. LIU Jian(2011, 2012) consider the 
games model between manufacturer and retailer under 
government subsidy in the wholesale price contract, 
evaluates the impact of different government subsidies 
model on the product price,  demand, enterprise 
performance, and give us a new perspective on designing 
of supply chain coordination mechanisms.
2.  COORDINATION OF ONE-SUPPLIER-
MULTIPLE-RETAILERS SUPPLY CHAIN
Eppen and Iyer (1997) focus on backup agreements 
between a supplier and multiple retailers. The results 
show that backup arrangements have a substantial impact 
on expected profits and result in an increase in the 
production quantity. Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) study 
the coordination of a supply chain with a supplier and 
multiple risk-averse retailers. Bernstein and Federgruen 
(2005) consider decentralized supply chain with 
competing (noncompeting) retailers, by wholesale price 
contract. They design contractual arrangements which 
allow the decentralized setting to perform as well as a 
centralized one. Khouja and Mehrez (1996) solve a multi-
product newsboy model in which multiple discounts are 
used to sell excess inventory under a budget constraint or 
storage. They show that such a quantity flexibility contract 
can achieve supply chain coordination. Plambeck and 
Taylor (2005) coordinate the supply chain with a supplier 
and multiple retailers, by quantity flexibility contract. Kim 
and Hwang (1989) maximize: the gain of the buyer, the 
economic gain of the supplier resultant from revising price 
and order size, and the sum of the gains of both parties. 
They suggest how the supplier can induce the retailers to a 
order-size level of mutual benefit and predetermined price. 
Yao et al. (2008) study the coordination of supply chain 
with a supplier and two competing retailers, by a revenue-
sharing contract. Zhang et al. (2012) extend the model of 
Yao et al. (2008) to demand disruptions setting.
3.  COORDINATION OF MULTIPLE-
SUPPLIERS-ONE-RETAILER SUPPLY 
CHAIN
3.1  Substitutable Suppliers
Wang and Liu (2008) study the coordination of supply 
chain with multiple suppliers and a retailer, by an option 
contract. Gui et al. (2011) deal with supplier’s delay in 
payments and supply chain coordination under retailer’s 
sales effort. They construct the multiple-one supply chain 
model and  analyze the coordination condition. 
3.2  Complementary Suppliers
The second kind of multiple-one supply chain is 
assembly system (i.e., assembly supply chain, Leng and 
Parlar 2010). In an assembly system, there are multiple 
upstream firms sell complementary components to a 
downstream firm. The upstream firms not only compete 
with each other (for example, all upstream firms strive to 
increase their individual component prices charged to the 
downstream firm to gain an advantage on sales revenue); 
but also cooperate with each other (for example, to 
assemble a final product, each upstream firm’s component 
should be matched by all other components). Gerchak and 
Wang are first to study the coordination in decentralized 
assembly systems with random demand. They show that a 
wholesale-price-driven scheme can be used to coordinate a 
push assembly system and a revenue-plus-surplus-subsidy 
incentive scheme can be used to coordinate a pull model. 
Zou et al. (2008) extend the model of Gerchak and Wang 
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(2004) to the two-period setting. Gurnani and Gerchak 
(2007) and Yan et al. (2010) investigate the coordination 
in decentralized assembly system with random yield. 
Güler and Bilgic (2009) investigate the coordination in 
decentralized assembly system in which the demand and 
the yield are both random. Zhang et al. (2008) investigate 
the coordination in decentralized assembly system where 
the final product is sold in two configurations. Fu et al. 
(2013) study the coordination in decentralized assembly 
system with loss-averse suppliers.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although there are many studies on supply chain 
coordination, few studies classify and summarize these 
studies. In this paper, we review the exciting studies on 
supply chain coordination from the perspective of supply 
chain framework. That is, one-supplier-one-retailer 
supply chain, one-supplier-multiple-retailers supply chain, 
multiple-suppliers-one-retailer supply chain. 
There are many opportunities for future research on 
supply chain coordination. An interesting topic is to allow 
the uncertain exchange rate (the existing studies on supply 
chain coordination mainly focus on uncertain demand, 
yield, etc.). It is also worth investigating the coordination 
of supply chain with multiple suppliers and multiple 
retailers.
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